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Professor Jaffa's paper represents an important step in
interpreting the United States Constitution.' Professor Jaffa
demonstrates that the advocates of historical interpretation are
in fact descendants of John C. Calhoun rather than of the
Framers; that they consider Edmund Burke, but not Abraham
Lincoln, a "Defender of the Constitution; 2 and that they read
God and natural rights endowed by man's creator out of the
Constitution.
Professor Jaffa's critique is all the more devastating
because he is himself a conservative and a historian. Because
he is a conservative, the reader senses his sympathy for what
Attorney General Meese, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Judge
Robert Bork are attempting to accomplish. Because he is a his-
torian, Professor Jaffa, like his predecessor in many ways,
Edward Corwin, approaches the politically charged field of
constitutional interpretation with the truthworthy attitude of
the scholar, rather than that of the advocate.
Despite my admiration for both his undertaking and the
soundness of his results, I confess an impatience with his
paper. I would like to understand his critique at the point of
actually interpreting the Constitution. If, as it appears at vari-
ous points in his text, Professor Jaffa agrees with the votes
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1. Professor Jaffa's paper does not deal with all of the problems that the original
intent position, however interpreted, faces. Such questions as "who counts as a
framer," "what is the relevance of the ratification process?" or even "why should
intention matter in the first place?" do not occupy him here. In this paper Professor
Jaffa deals primarily with a much narrower question, how well do the self-professed
advocates of original intent understand the intellectual and political presumptions of
the generation they accept as Framers? Surely it is justifiable to deal with an issue of
manageable scale rather than to attempt to do all things at once. I will limit my reply
to this same issue but from a different, one might say left-wing, perspective.
2. Jaffa, What Were the "Original Intentions" of the Framers of the Constitution
of the United States, 10 U. PUGET SouND L. REV. 351 (1987) [hereinafter Jaffa].
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cast by the Calhounites on current issues before the Supreme
Court, how is it that their flawed methodology can yield relia-
ble results? Is Dred Scott v. Sanford3 the last case in which a
proper understanding of original intent mattered? Is slavery
the last issue on which the Framers may be said to have spo-
ken a word of liberation?
My subject is this gap in Professor Jaffa's paper between
the consciousness of the Framers and the practice of judicial
review today. The understanding that Professor Jaffa brings
to the intent of the Framers is one that opens up the Constitu-
tion to the call of justice. Professor Jaffa's Framers are not
enemies of the poor and the oppressed, the criminal defendant
and the homosexual. Nor are they protectors of the rich and
powerful, the washed and the comfortable.
Professor Jaffa begins with Dred Scott.4 For conservatives
today, Dred Scott represents the unfortunate triumph of mor-
alism in judicial review. Because Chief Justice Taney did not
stick to the principles of original intent, but instead responded
to the passions of the day, he condemned blacks as mere prop-
erty, which Congress then must protect as property in the
territories.
Professor Jaffa asserts that this conservative account is
false. Taney was in no sense responding to the passions of the
day. Taney was in fact interpreting the Constitution precisely
in accordance with original intent as Meese and the others
understand that concept. In analyzing the rights of black peo-
ple, Taney considered the Constitution to be no more than pos-
itive law.
Here, according to Professor Jaffa, was Taney's great error
and the great error of today's conservatives. Though faithful
in a sense to the constitutional text and its treatment of slav-
ery, Taney failed to deal with the "genuine principles" of the
Constitution that are found in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence.5 It is in the light of the equality of all men, a light bind-
3. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (Congress bound to protect
slaveowner's property rights in slaves in federal territories). Dred Scott represents
Professor Jaffa's starting point. See Jaffa, supra note 2.
4. Jaffa, supra note 2.
5. "[The Declaration of Independence] tells us why slavery must be regarded as an
anomaly, a necessary evil entailed upon the Constitution, but not flowing from-or
consistent with-its genuine principles." Id at 364; see also id at 408 (appendix A):
"[T]he principles of the Declaration of Independence are the principles of the
Constitution."
Unlike today's conservatives, Taney did not deny all authority of the Declaration
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ing on constitutional interpretation, that Dred Scott stands
condemned.
Professor Jaffa's analysis of Dred Scott illustrates a funda-
mental ambiguity about original intent that permeates his
paper. In his view, Taney did not rely on any sort of Framers'
intent. In determining the Constitution's view of blacks, Taney
looked to the text of the Constitution, noted its obvious accept-
ance of slavery and concluded from the text that blacks had no
rights that the white man was bound to recognize.6 This
approach may be called textual intent, and Taney's account of
the text's intent is said by Professor Jaffa to be a plausible
one.
7
In contrast to, or in amplification of, the method of textual
intent, one might employ original intent, asking what was the
intent behind the text. "Original intent" employed in this
fashion might mean the views of the Framers on the issue at
hand. For example, their attitude toward blacks. On the other
hand, "original intent" might refer instead to the intent of the
Framers generally in creating the Constitution. For purposes
of this paper, I will call the first, specific intent, and the sec-
ond, general intent.
Professor Jaffa is criticizing Taney for ignoring the Fram-
ers' general intent, not for ignoring the Framers' specific
intent concerning the status of blacks as human beings. This
criticism may at first seem odd. Taney was wrong in Dred
Scott in terms of specific intent as Professor Jaffa demon-
strates.8 Madison and Jefferson clearly believed blacks were
human beings entitled to the inherent rights of all men. But
Professor Jaffa criticizes Taney for misinterpreting the Decla-
ration of Independence, not for ignoring the opinion of those
who framed the Constitution's pro-slavery clauses. For Profes-
sor Jaffa, the Declaration of Independence is the lens through
which the text of the Constitution must always be studied,
however clear the text seems to be. After all, in the case of
of Independence. He asserted, however, that in light of the constitutional textual
acceptance of slavery, blacks could not have been included in the commitment to the
equality of all men. Taney read the Declaration in light of the Constitution, rather
than the other way around. See id. at 368-69.
6. Id. at 353-54.
7. "Plausible" is far too weak a word. Although Professor Jaffa rejects the Taney
interpretation, he acknowledges at length that elements of the constitutional text
strongly support the Constitution's apparent pro-slavery position. Id at 407-10
(appendix A).
8. Id. at 390-93.
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blacks, the text was relatively clear and could be read fairly as
racist. Thus Professor Jaffa is arguing for the method of gen-
eral intent; he is not proposing to consult the Framers on the
specific issues that come before the Supreme Court today.'
What was the Framers' general intent as revealed in the
Declaration of Independence? Professor Jaffa states that the
Framers' primary purpose was the creation of a government
that would "secure" certain rights.' Indeed, "to secure these
rights" was viewed by the Framers as the sole legitimate pur-
pose of any government." The Framers were attempting to
establish in positive law, "[t]he primacy of rights and of right,
understood in the light of the laws of nature .... ,12 Professor
Jaffa describes these rights: "These rights were the unalien-
able rights with which all men had been equally 'endowed by
their Creator' under 'the laws of nature and of nature's God.' 3
Certain of these rights are denominated in the Declaration of
Independence: "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness."
For Professor Jaffa the Declaration is not merely a precatory
document to be trotted out for Fourth of July speeches.
Rather, he calls the Declaration "the most fundamental dimen-
sion of the law of the Constitution.' 14
Professor Jaffa's major example, Dred Scott, illustrates the
role that he thinks general intent should play in interpreting
the Constitution. The Declaration's assumption of basic
human equality represents the Constitution's "genuine" princi-
ple on the issue of slavery. The doctrine of the inequality of
blacks, strongly supported by hints in the constitutional text,
should be considered a mere compromise with transient polit-
ical forces.
Professor Jaffa's main purpose is to show that neither
today's conservatives nor today's liberals understand and fol-
low original intent. The conservatives who claim to embody
original intent do not understand "what . . . original intent
was.' 5 They are "antagonists" of original intent 16 because,
9. "In asking what were the original intentions of the founding fathers, we are
asking what principles of moral and political philosophy guided them. We are not
asking their personal judgments upon contingent matters." Id at 386.
10. Id. at 355.
11. Id at 378.
12. Id at 384.
13. Id at 355-56.
14. Id. at 363.
15. Id. at 354..
16. Id at 356.
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like the apologists for slavery of an earlier time, they "rejected
the ground of the Constitution in natural justice...."I'
At much less length, Professor Jaffa criticizes liberal juris-
prudence on precisely the same ground, that liberals reject
"natural rights teaching."' 8  Because the individual has no
inherent rights that the majority is bound to respect, liberals
seeking to enhance liberty must refer to an evolving conscience
of a future, reformed "scientific" society."' 9 Conservatives and
liberals, thus, "stand upon common ground."2 That ground
turns out, jurisprudentially, to be a positivist vision of law that
grounds authority in the will of the people, either today's will
or that of tomorrow.
What are the implications of this powerful critique? What
sort of jurisprudence would result from a modern commitment
to the natural law principles of the Declaration of
Independence?
Professor Jaffa does not expressly venture onto this
ground. Unfortunately, his implied prescription for conserva-
tives is to accept an antiquated natural rights outlook, and for
liberals, to abandon the search for a modern one.
To see the first point, imagine Professor Jaffa addressing
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the "pure legal positivist."2 Chief
Justice Rehnquist would assert that there are no "self-evident
truths," that there is no accessibility to a divine intention for
humankind, and, thus, no endowed rights.22 Or at least Chief
17. Id. at 362.
18. Id. at 394.
19. Id. at 394-95; see also id. at 355-56.
20. Id. at 395.
21. Id. at 393.
22. This is my conclusion from reading Chief Justice Rehnquist's more ambitious
attempts to declare a theoretical approach to constitutional interpretation. See
Rehnquist, Government by Cliche: Keynote Address of the Earl F. Nelson Lecture
Series, 45 Mo. L. REV. 379 (1980) [hereinafter Government by Cliche. As I discuss
infra note 23, Professor Jaffa views my statement in the text here, as well as similar
expressions of mine elsewhere, as overstatements of what Chief Justice Rehnquist has
actually said. Thus, although I have not changed my view, I add the next statement in
the text as a toned-down alternative. I would urge the interested reader, and since this
man is now Chief Justice of the United States it behooves us all to be interested, to
read the two articles herein cited. I find revealing, in particular, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's argument in The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693,
704-05 (1976), that all moral judgments are only "personal" and "individual" until
enacted into law, and his argument in Government by Cliche, 45 Mo. L. REV. at 390-
392, that the authority of the Constitution is grounded in majority rule rather than in
"any principles of rational law." These expressions are entirely inconsistent with the
ideas of self-evident truth and endowed rights. I know it sounds strange to criticize a
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Justice Rehnquist would say that if people disagree about these
matters, discussion must be closed. At the point of disagree-
ment, there is nothing more than subjective preference, which
may or may not be backed by power.23
Justice for being an atheist when we usually regard such matters as personal. But I do
not mean that Chief Justice Rehnquist attends no chuch, which I do not know and
which is none of my business, but rather that he is a jurisprudential atheist, a man for
whom law is grounded in nothing more than the power of the majority. These matters
are discussed in great depth in Professor Jaffa's appendix C, supra note 2, at 422.
23. Professor Jaffa is kind enough to include in his critique of Chief Justice
Rehnquist in appendix C several references to a short article I wrote in the Wall
Street Journal, Aug. 7, 1986, at 20, col. 3. I would say that Professor Jaffa states my
criticism of Chief Justice Rehnquist far better than I could, and did, myself.
Professor Jaffa errs, however, in criticizing my characterization of Chief Justice
Rehnquist as one "who does not believe there is such a thing as right and wrong."
Professor Jaffa argues that what Chief Justice Rehnquist says is that right and wrong
cannot be logically demonstrated, not that they do not exist, and thus like Carl Becker,
Chief Justice Rehnquist may nevertheless believe in the right as a fundamental
reality. The difference between the two cases is that Carl Becker's belief justified
action, in his case a willingness to kill or be killed. In the case of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the unavailability of logic to resolve issues of value is an argument for a
judge not to act. This unwillingness to act suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist does
not accept the difference between right and wrong as representing a fundamental
reality.
For Chief Justice Rehnquist, the world is divided between facts and opinions.
Facts are amenable to empirical or logical verification. Opinions are subject to no sort
of verification. When I called Chief Justice Rehnquist's commitment to an objective
analysis of original intent "unobtainable," I had in mind these categories of empirical
or logical verification. Obviously, the views of Madison and Jefferson are subject
neither to empirical nor logical verification. One must look at the evidence and make
reasoned argument. But, of course, one can proceed in the same way; that is by
argument rather than verification when discussing fundamental values, which, Chief
Justice Rehnquist says, is the reason for banishing such talk from the courtroom.
It should be noted that Professor Jaffa's category of reason at times seems to go a
great deal beyond Chief Justice Rehnquist's idea of how an argument can be justified.
Reason for Professor Jaffa is not always limited to empiricism and logic, but partakes
of all the different aspects of human understanding. This approach to reason seems to
parallel Edmond Cahn's description of the sense of injustice: "a blend of reason and
empathy." See Ledewitz, Edmond Cahn's Sense of Injustice: A Contemporary
Reintroduction, 3 J. LAW & REL. 277, 285 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Cahn]. At other
times, however, Professor Jaffa treats reason as merely empirical or logical. Consider
Professor Jaffa's assertion that a black person's humanity "is a matter of fact and not
of opinion. Jaffa, supra note 2, at 446 (appendix C). That it is, but not because the
slave codes inconsistently treated blacks. For even if the slave codes had consistently
degraded blacks, blacks would still have retained their humanity. To put this another
way, the humanity of blacks is a "fact" more fundamental then either empirical or
logical demonstrations. Professor Jaffa faults Carl Becker for acknowledging this, but
what arguments could "objectively prove" the humanity of a person? The category of
the real is objectively true, but may not be amenable to the sort of demonstration
Professor Jaffa sometimes suggests reason can provide. Compare Edmond Cahn's
comment about slavery, that it "was doomed to disappear everywhere, for no other
reason than that a slave is a man." E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: AN
ANTHROPOCENTRIC VIEW OF LAW 15 (1949). Even though Cahn did not share Professor
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Professor Jaffa associates the Framers with a different
view of the universe. According to this view, political science
and law are capable of uncovering a "true understanding 24 of
the individual and her relation to society. There are principles,
"truths 'applicable to all men and all times,' ",25 that Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist must accept if he wishes to interpret the consti-
tution in accordance with original intent.
It is not clear how Professor Jaffa would like Chief Justice
Rehnquist to respond to his position. If the Chief Justice
examines modern philosophy, history, anthropology and, yes,
even science, as well as his own being and concludes that this
claim about eternal truth is incoherent, an echo of a less
sophisticated time, he can hardly will himself to believe other-
wise. Professor Jaffa obviously agrees with the Framers that
their views are self-evident. But Professor Jaffa knows he is
addressing an audience in which no one else is persuaded.26
This is precisely the dilemma John Hart Ely brilliantly
described in Democracy and Distrust.27 In assessing a hypo-
thetical natural law jurisprudence, Ely asked what we would
do with a constitutional provision protecting ghosts. How
could we who know that there are no such things attempt to
interpret the Constitution as if we did believe in ghosts and
apply the implications of ghost-belief? Such an undertaking
would be self-defeating. Because we do not believe in ghosts,
an appropriate application of a ghost provision would be
beyond us.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who does not believe in the ghost
of natural law, seems to have two intellectually honest options
if he were to accept Professor Jaffa's account of the Framers'
views. One option would be to abandon original intent alto-
gether and to find some other basis to interpret the Constitu-
tion. Chief Justice Rehnquist would reject this approach
because in his view only original intent is a ground beyond sub-
jective judicial will. The second option, the one the Chief Jus-
Jaffa's confidence in reason alone, he did not abandon the true. Nor did he abandon
reasoning about the true.
24. Jaffa, supra note 2, at 425 (appendix C).
25. Id at 374.
26. "The crisis of American constitutionalism-the crisis of the West-lies
precisely in the denial that there are any such principles or truths. It is no less a crisis
in the heart of American conservatism than of American liberalism." See id. at 386.
See generally id at 415-22 (appendix B).
27. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 38-40 (1980) [hereinafter ELY].
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tice usually attempts to utilize,2 8 is to find in history the
Framers' views, their "personal judgments upon contingent
matters," on a particular issue before the Supreme Court.2 9
The advantage of this approach is that such specific intent is
sometimes reasonably ascertainable and thus serves to limit
the judiciary's otherwise plenary power to rule at will.
Professor Jaffa's paper demonstrates that the second
option is an illusion because specific intent is not true to the
Framers' larger purposes. In that sense, it is not an original
intent methodology at all. Thus, even if Chief Justice Rehn-
quist could establish, for example, that the Framers thought
Congress possessed the authority to proscribe abortions, the
Supreme Court should not enforce specific judgment if, under
today's circumstances, to do so would violate the Framers'
understanding of equality and liberty. We must understand
"what principles of moral and political philosophy guided" the
Framers 0 before we make legal judgments in which the con-
stitutional text is silent or ambiguous. Furthermore, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's underlying and implied idea, that if there
is no clear textual prohibition, government may act, is an
excellent illustration that specific intent without a larger
framework is dangerous. The Framers did not assume that,
generally, government could act. They assumed the converse
that, generally, individuals could act. Thus, there is no genuine
constitutional presumption against judicial action when the
constitutional text is not a clear guide.
Professor Jaffa does not argue for such specific intent.
Nor, of course, is he proposing to abandon original intent. Pro-
fessor Jaffa wants conservatives to subscribe to the "true"
understanding of original intent3 ' both because this is a legiti-
mate method of interpretation and, more important, because
the Framers' views of man and majority are themselves eter-
nally true.
But what sense does this call for a return to the "true"
understanding of original intent make when addressed to peo-
ple who, in good faith, find original intent to be gibberish?
Here we would expect Professor Jaffa to show that the Fram-
ers' views are true and that modern critics of natural rights are
28. I describe briefly Chief Justice Rehnquist's reliance on specific intent, which I
call the "historical method" in Cahn, supra note 23, at 314-19 n.163.
29. Jaffa, supra note 2, at 386.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 425 (appendix C).
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wrong. He avoids this effort, however. Perhaps he feels that,
as a historian, it is not his place. Or perhaps, he imagines that
once conservatives understand "what the original intent was,"
they will come to believe it. This is a forlorn hope.
What Professor Jaffa seems to urge, instead, is that judges
rely upon the Declaration of Independence whether they
believe in self-evident truths or not. It is clear that the Fram-
ers were committed to equality, life, liberty, and property. It is
also clear that the Framers presumed that individual prefer-
ences in these realms would govern even against the pro-
nouncements of majoritarian governments. If we cannot
believe what they believed, we can at least follow loyally
where the Framers led.
This approach, to act as if we believed, turns today's con-
servatives into a generation of atheists carrying forward a tra-
dition of theism. And it turns the truths of the Declaration
into principles we decide to accept as if true. What do such
pretenders do, however, with disputes about the implications of
equality, liberty, and property? Professor Jaffa provides no
answer to this crucial question. But judging from Professor
Jaffa's criticism of judicial activism and legislation,"2 his deter-
mination to avoid any new applications of the Declaration of
Independence, it is obvious that we are to find answers in Aris-
totle and Cicero, and if not in them directly, in them as inter-
preted by the Framers' generation.
Professor Jaffa demonstrates this tendency in his refer-
ence to racial quotas in appendix A.3' Attorney General Meese
asserts that racial quotas are unconstitutional as a violation of
equality. With this Professor Jaffa agrees. But we know this,
asserts Professor Jaffa, only from the perspective of "the Dec-
laration's understanding of equality."'
I assume that the "Declaration's understanding" means
simply the views of Madison and Jefferson, or of their teachers
Aristotle and Cicero, regarding the meaning and portent of
equality. But this historical approach treats the Declaration as
a document frozen in time. The authority of the Declaration's
assertions cannot be based on age, but on their truth. But if
truth is the ground of their authority, we cannot avoid asking
ourselves what is the nature of the equality we may all justly
32. See, e.g., id. at 356, and 357-59.
33. I& at 402-04 (appendix A).
34. Id. at 405 (appendix A).
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claim from birth and what are its consequences. That is, we
must ask this question of ourselves and not just of Aristotle,
Cicero, Madison, and Jefferson. I have no love for quotas, but
real questions of moral right and political policy cannot be
handled by quotes from the ancients about abstractions like
equality.
Self-conscious emulation is not natural law. Nor is it true
to the Framers' intent. It is an archaeological dig into the rem-
nants of natural law. It is an attempt to hold human under-
standing still at a certain point in time. Neither a judge nor a
legal thinker can be true to the tradition of natural law unless
it lives in her. Merely to appeal to equality without commit-
ment to the reality of equality, its self-evident quality, is to cel-
ebrate the shell without the substance. And the results that
such an antiquated method purports to yield cannot do justice
to the living tradition that the Declaration of Independence
celebrated. It is not that Aristotle is not to be consulted; it is
rather that we have seen and experienced some truth since
then. It is dangerous to attempt to apply the insights of old
literally.
But Professor Jaffa discourages any contemporary attempt
to live within the principles of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. He is wedded to antiquity. The problem for Professor
Jaffa is that he wishes to be true to an original intent that is
revolutionary in its call for natural justice, but also wants to
restrict carefully the implications of original intent.
Professor Jaffa takes pains to insulate himself from what
he calls judicial activism. His methods of limitation are first,
fidelity to the text; second, opposition to judicial "evolutionary
conscience"; and third, the requirement of corporate judicial
action. For those who consider the principles of the Declara-
tion of Independence to be true, these negative techniques
interfere with an attempt to practice the constitutional tradi-
tion bequeathed to us by the Framers.
Professor Jaffa makes the textual point in a discussion of
Justice Brennan's opposition to the death penalty. Justice
Brennan's Constitution is said by Professor Jaffa to represent
principles without a text that ignores the fifth amendment's
clear acknowledgment of capital punishment. If we take origi-
nal intent as seriously for issues today as Professor Jaffa does
for slavery, we see that the Constitution does not support capi-
tal punishment.
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According to Professor Jaffa, though the Constitution pro-
motes slavery in several respects, it is not a pro-slavery docu-
ment. Slavery is a prudent compromise, not a matter of
genuine constitutional principles. The genuine principle is said
to be human equality as demonstrated by the Declaration of
Independence.
But the Declaration of Independence also proclaims the
unalienable right of human persons to "life." One may say
that the calculated taking of human life is presumptively disfa-
vored under the Declaration of Independence, just as slavery
clearly is disfavored.
The fifth amendment 35 no more turns the Constitution
into a pro-death penalty document than the fugitive slave pro-
vision turns the Constitution into a pro-slavery document. The
fifth amendment represents a limitation on capital punish-
ment, that it was not to be carried out in the future as it had
been in the past. One could hardly call the due process clause
an endorsement of capital punishment. It acknowledges that
capital punishment was a prevailing practice, but this recogni-
tion is similar to the recognition accorded slavery. The genu-
ine principle of the Constitution is "life," just as surely as it is
"equality."
In fact, the attack on capital punishment through the
eighth amendment is much more consistent with the text of
the Constitution than is Professor Jaffa's attack on slavery.
The constitutional text seems actually to endorse slavery. Con-
versely, the eighth amendment was viewed at the time of its
introduction and criticized as an invitation to abolish capital
punishment.36 Reading the reference to deprivation of life in
the fifth amendment as if it had been intended to quiet the
fear of abolition is more weight than this reforming provision
will bear. The due process clause is more easily interpreted as
quieting the opposite fear: that the death penalty would be
widespread and discretionary if the eighth amendment were
not interpreted to eliminate it. To exclude the due process
35. "[Nlor shall any prisoner be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
36. This is the gist of the celebrated objection of Representative Livemore of New
Hampshire during consideration of the proposed eighth amendment: "[I]t is sometimes
necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their
ears cut off; but are we in the future to be prevented from inflicting these
punishments because they are cruel?" 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
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clause might have suggested that a citizen could be deprived of
life without due process.
I do not mean to argue literally that the death penalty and
slavery issues are the same. We know on good authority that
many of the Framers did oppose slavery, but agreed to its
inclusion in the Constitution as the cost of union. There is no
reason to think the Framers similarly opposed capital punish-
ment, but refrained from condemning it as an act of compro-
mise. But the Framers' personal views on the death penalty
should not matter. Professor Jaffa does not rely primarily on
the Framer's personal opinions. He relies instead on the public
principles of the Declaration of Independence. Professor Jaffa
would say that even if many of the Framers supported slavery
(and of course some did, thus requiring compromise), the Dec-
laration of Independence would still condemn it because the
Declaration proclaims equality. Similarly, even if the Framers
supported the death penalty, which I do not know to be true,
the Declaration would still condemn it, for it proclaims the
right to life.
Professor Jaffa's textual attack on the abolition of the
death penalty is particularly unpersuasive given the Framers'
view that a bill of rights was unnecessary. The Bill of Rights
was introduced only later to respond to fear of an oppressive
federal government. But that must mean that the federal gov-
ernment was barred from violating the principles later embod-
ied in the Bill of Rights even without these express limitations.
Such a view would have supposed that article I did not author-
ize the federal government to act oppressively or, more gener-
ally, that no government could legitimately claim the right to
oppress its own people, notwithstanding prevailing doctrines of
parliamentary supremacy.
To translate these generalities into a modern context, a
German judge in the 1930's or a South African judge today
would be entitled, under the Framers' view of legitimate
authority, to condemn oppression by their governments
whether positive law sanctioned judicial review or not. That is,
governments may claim only powers consistent with inherent
rights. Since the individual citizen would not, or could not,
37. Consider the comment of Alexander Hamilton in the 84th FEDERALIST: "I go
further, and affirm that bills of rights ... are not only unnecessary in the proposed
Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to
powers not granted.... For why declare that things shall not be done which there is
no power to do?" THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 537 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
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have ceded3" the power of tyranny to his government, tyranny
is never legitimate.39
This is a jurisprudence of liberation, if ever one existed.
But we find its expositor, Professor Jaffa, suggesting that a
judge in America, where the Framers' views have the author-
ity of positive law as well as inherent right, may not rely on
the principles of the ends of legitimate government, but must
stay within the text of the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights is
not a limit on individual liberty. Chief Justice Rehnquist may
believe that government may lawfully do anything not prohib-
ited by the Bill of Rights. But Professor Jaffa knows that this
was not the Framers' intention. Their intention was to specify
some of the limits on government, but not all of them. And
this intention was written specifically into the text of the ninth
amendment.4" Where should the judge look to see what the
rest of the limits on government power are? The judge need
look no further than the principles of the Declaration of
Independence.
A second aspect of Professor Jaffa's resistance to judicial
activism is his attack on "evolutionary conscience"4 1 in legal
thinking. Professor Jaffa accuses liberal jurisprudence of dis-
missing the insights of the Framers in the name of new
insights said to be based on science.
The heart of this critique is valid. The Framers proposed
eternal principles based on an unchanging human nature cre-
ated by God. Liberal and radical left-wing legal thinkers today
reject all such conceptions as epistemologically naive. This is
as true of main line consensus thinkers like Owen Fiss,4 2 and
Harry Wellington,4" as it is of the Conference on Critical Legal
Studies.44
38. Professor Jaffa does not attribute to the Framers a social contract into which
one might actually enter. As the Virginia Declaration of Rights put it, people "cannot"
divest their posterity of inherent rights. Jaffa, supra note 2, at 385.
39. I should add here a reference to the brave Ghanian judges whose insistence
upon the availability of habeas corpus, despite a military constitution that apparently
precluded judicial review, ultimately proved fatal to several of them. Cover, The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forward., Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 59
(1983).
40. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
41. Jaffa, supra note 2, at 385.
42. See 0. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982).
43. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
44. See, e.g., Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
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Although this criticism may be valid with regard to those
who do not accept the Framers' fundamental notions of endur-
ing standards of right and wrong, what of those who share the
Framers' commitments? Are they condemned never to learn
anything from science or other advances in human thinking?
Consider the issue of protecting developing fetuses under
the fifth and fourteenth amendment. The long term signifi-
cance of this issue is that when and if Roe v. Wade45 is over-
ruled, a period of state choice with regard to abortion laws will
be ushered in unless due process and equal protection are read
to require protection of the unborn.
The prevailing view on the Court, in fact the only view
expressed in Roe v. Wade, is that fetuses are not "persons" for
purposes of the fourteenth amendment and so are not pro-
tected. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion utilized the spe-
cific intent technique Judge Bork has used to illustrate an
argument against the availability of equal protection for gay
people.46 Justice Blackmun argued that the Framers of the
fourteenth amendment were not considering fetuses when
they wrote the word "person.
47
This is the sort of simplistic original intent analysis that
Professor Jaffa has in mind when he says that we are not
bound by the specific judgments of the Framers on contingent
matters.48 I doubt that the Framers of the fifth amendment or
YALE L.J. 1 (1984). I am not suggesting that Joseph Singer's comprehensive statement
is representative of Critical Legal Studies thinking in all ways; but insofar as he rejects
the Framers' worldview, he is quite representative.
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Roe invalidated state laws prohibiting abortion during the
first six months of pregnancy).
46. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 823, 828 (1986) [hereinafter Bork].
Assume for the sake of the argument that a judge's study of the evidence
shows that both black and general racial equality were clearly intended, but
that equality on matters such as sexual orientation was not under discussion.
.... [The judge] has, therefore, no warrant to displace a legislative choice
that prohibits certain forms of sexual behavior.
I am never sure how literally specific intent proponents intend to be taken. Judge
Bork uses the example of sexual orientation to illustrate a group whose rights were
"not under discussion." But gays are a politically easy target who have achieved little
protection in any event under the fourteenth amendment. Would Judge Bork launch
the same wholesale attack against any judicial protection of the equal rights of
women? Surely sexual equality "was not under discussion" when the fourteenth
amendment was adopted.
47. 410 U.S. at 156-59.
48. Jaffa, supra note 2, at 386.
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the fourteenth amendment thought about the rights of the
fetus.
Even Professor Jaffa's "true understanding" of the Fram-
ers' original intent is little help in evaluating the rights of the
fetus. Acknowledgment of individual rights does not tell us
whether the fetus is to be recognized as such an individual, as a
member of the human family. I admit that the analysis Profes-
sor Jaffa attributes to Lincoln concerning whether blacks are
human beings seems to me so unerringly applicable to the
unborn that it is disconcerting to read (if blacks are not human
beings, may masters then eat them?).49 Nevertheless, given
the nature of the question, original intent is a very uncertain
guide concerning the unborn.
But science teaches us a great deal. Every act of fetal sur-
gery, every early intervention to improve the health of the
developing child, every sonogram proudly displayed by new
parents, in short, all that modern science teaches us about
developmental biology proclaims the fetus to be our young
brother or sister in the human family. And once we know this,
we cannot forget it for purposes of a legal argument. These
insights do not resolve the abortion dilemma. In fact, they
reveal it for the dilemma it is.5° But the insights of science are
as entitled to a hearing as any other claim to truth.
Nor is new learning limited to physical sciences beyond
the grasp of the Framers. New learning extends to new
insights into older practices with which the Framers were
familiar. A good example is the view of the Framers that pri-
vate property is the "product of a man's labor. ' 51 It is no
secret that high on the political/legal agenda of the Neo-Locke-
49. Id at 446-48 (appendix C).
50. Professor Jaffa desires the "prudential" morality of the Framers. "But
knowing that [slavery] is wrong does not, of itself, tell us what to do about it." Id. at
371. The situation with regard to abortion is similar. Although the unborn child is
always an innocent victim, even in the cases of rape and incest, it is unthinkable to me
that anyone would consider forcing a woman to live with that experience by bringing
the pregnancy to term. Even in the so-called "easier" cases of a woman's emotional or
financial incapacity, it is relevant to consider the burden society is content to visit on
young mothers. By social convention and the resulting laziness of law, society
encourages sexual exploits by young men by force or seduction, dependence by
women, and irresponsibility as to birth control. Then, after the baby is born, society
allows the father to remove himself both physically and financially so that essentially
all of the burdens of parenthood remain with the mother. If abortion is to be a crime,
one must act with full awareness of society's callousness about young life once it is
brought into the world.
51. Id. at 380.
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ans, Stephen Macedo, Richard Epstein, the Cato Institute and
all the rest, is an attack on the New Deal and the Welfare
State in the name of the Framers' commitment to individual
property rights.52 Since every man is entitled to the fruits of
his own labor, progressive taxation, income redistribution and
governmental regulation all become disfavored, if not unconsti-
tutional. But Marxism, as well as the lessons of an intercon-
nected industrial society, should have taught us something
about the role of property. Property is never a matter of indi-
vidual right alone. Property is a social product. This knowl-
edge shapes our understanding of natural rights.
While one may say this is a matter of evolutionary con-
science, it reflects simple growth of human understanding.
But it does not follow that the starting point of inherent rights
grounded in human nature and nature's God is thereby lost.
What did the Framers bequeath to us in the Declaration of
Independence? Self-evident truth. The equality of mankind.
Certain rights that flow from these insights. It should come as
no surprise that people in a later age still committed to self-
evident truth and the equality of humankind might think dif-
ferently about the rights that are thus implied. This bothers
Professor Jaffa, but I wonder whether Madison and Jefferson
would have objected.
It is important to Professor Jaffa that the Framers'
insights be permanent.5 3 And they are. Man's creatureliness,
his place in the world as one who seeks his purpose, is not sub-
ject to change. The equality of persons, the claim of each of us
to be recognized as supremely important, is not subject to
change. The inherent rights of man, that there are limits to
what any individual or majority may rightly do to a fellow
human being, are not subject to change. But the particular con-
52. Stephen Macedo's excellent monograph brings much of this together. S.
MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION (1986). Fittingly, the monograph is
published by the Cato Institute with an introduction by Richard Epstein. Macedo
argues a theory of original intent very close to that of Professor Jaffa and criticizes the
skepticism of Judge Bork and Attorney General Meese on much the same grounds as
does Professor Jaffa. Unlike Professor Jaffa, however, Macedo raises the issue of
protection of property from government interference. Of course, Professor Epstein
has done so with even more vigor. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
53. "Historical experience means experience in time, but what is permanent is
recognized as an intelligible necessity-or as grounded in an intelligible necessity-
outside of time." Jaffa, supra note 2, at 385-86.
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tent as well as the application are subject to change. They
have to be if the constitutional tradition is to live.
Does this level of abstraction distort the Framers?' I sup-
pose in a way it does. To be true to the Framers' view of real-
ity, we must reject some of the implications they drew from
man's equal endowment of rights.
But it is Professor Jaffa's third criticism, that Justice
Brennan is willing to act alone in his interpretation of the Con-
stitution, that seems the furthest removed from his explana-
tion of the Framers' original intent. In repeating the
textualism point made above, Professor Jaffa adds the
following:
Thus Justice Brennan finds the true meaning of the Consti-
tution, not in the text and not in any interpretation of the
text by others, including the entire political community act-
ing through the political process, but in some kind of 'striv-
ing', albeit 'not yet arrived.' This 'striving' may have the
character of a revelation vouchsafed to the Justice, but not
to anyone else.55
What sort of method does Professor Jaffa think is the
appeal to "self-evident" truths if not "revelation vouchsafed"
to certain people, in particular, to the Framers? In 1776, most
of humankind did not agree that "all men are created equal."
Professor Jaffa points out that the South later made precisely
the opposite claim.5" There is no appeal to "others" that can
decide the matter of the equality of all men, for it was and is a
matter of dispute. If, however, one sees the self-evidence of
the statement "all men are created equal," those proclaiming
inequality must be viewed as deluded. John Hart Ely makes
wonderful fun of the idea that those who disagree with one
person's view of natural law are denounced as wrong.57 He is
right that it is an indefensible embarrassment. Nevertheless,
show me a Nazi laughing at man's essential equality, and I say
the Nazi is either crazy or is denying the evidence of his own
54. Compare Judge Bork's criticism of distorting the Framers' specific intent by
over-abstraction. Bork, supra note 46, at 827-28.
55. Jaffa, supra note 2, at 357.
56. Id. at 392-94.
57. ELY, supra note 27, at 48: "Well, what may seem like the truth to you," said
the seventeen-year-old bus driver and part-time philosopher, "may not, of course, seem
like the truth to the other fella, you know."
"THEN THE OTHER FELLOW IS WRONG, IDIOT!" (quoting P. ROTH, THE
GREAT AMERICAN NOVEL 20 (1973)).
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being. All natural law, as the Framers understood, rests on
some such appeal to self-evident principles. This represents
one of the great weaknesses of natural law. But that does not
mean natural law is untrue.
Perhaps Justice Brennan is not committed to original
intent.' Accordingly, Justice Brennan's search for an evolving
consensus may in fact be subject to Professor Jaffa's criticism
that it represents arrogant subjectivity. But for Professor Jaffa
to criticize generally the idea of individual access to truth is an
appalling irony. Professor Jaffa believes and is totally commit-
ted to the proposition that all men are endowed by their Crea-
tor with certain unalienable rights. Now how did this idea
come to Professor Jaffa? Certainly, as he admits, the elites of
our time do not believe it. Philosophers reject it. Liberal and
conservative jurisprudence reject it. It may be that most
Americans still believe in inherent rights, but that traditional
belief may be fading under the pressure of positivism and
modernity.5 9 If the day should come that no one else takes the
idea seriously that man has inherent rights given by God,
would Professor Jaffa then abandon it? No. Because it is true.
Why then should a Justice of the Supreme Court interpreting
fundamental rights be subject to a numbers test?
The Supreme Court has not shied away from judgments
based on personal moral insight. Despite some energetic dis-
sents, the Court has condemned conduct that shocks the judi-
cial conscience or violates some similar formula.6' Even
58. I am sorry that Professor Jaffa makes so much of an isolated quotation from
Justice Brennan's speech in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution,
THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 11-25 (1986). Considering the speech as a whole, as well as
Justice Brennan's recent comments in the Harvard Law Review, Brennan,
Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View From the Court, 100
HARV. L. REV. 313 (1986), and, of course, his concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Brennan, J. concurring), I am not sure that Professor Jaffa has
accurately interpreted Justice Brennan's method. This matter is beyond my scope
here, I am content to deal with these isolated passages as given.
59. Professor Jaffa in fact complains that "professional philosophers" have "mined
and sapped the ordinary man's confidence in the vitality of ordinary language, and of
common sense moral judgments .. " Jaffa, supra note 2, at 416.
60. See generally Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445, 449 (1985): "This Court has long
held that certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the
unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of
justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." The classic cases are Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)
("conduct that shocks the conscience" or "afford[s] brutality the cloak of law") and
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) ("revolting to the sense of justice"). In
more recent cases, Court majorities have not used this express language and it has
[Vol. 10:449
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Justice O'Connor, a member of the conservative bloc on the
Court, has spoken in this idiom.6'
When the Court does this, as when, for example, the Court
condemns the use of the stomach pump in Rochin,62 it is with-
out regard to interpretations of the constitutional text by
others. It is, in fact, with only the vaguest nod toward the text
at all. And no nod at all to the political community. The
Court was not concerned in Rochin with what others thought;
such conduct is condemned by any civilized conscience.
Many of our greatest cases rely on such moral insights by
the Court. Brown v. Board of Education's63 condemnation of
segregation laws can be defended, if one is interested in doing
so, by its stabs at history and by the words "equal protection"
in the constitutional text. But Professor Jaffa is on sounder
ground in asserting that segregation laws were "utterly incon-
sistent with the ends of free government and hence of the Con-
stitution."'  Professor Jaffa's implication is that any practice
"utterly inconsistent with the ends of the free government"
violates the Constitution. And he is right. The Court certainly
agreed with this implication when it held that the federal gov-
ernment was also precluded from segregating blacks, despite
remained for dissents, often by Justice Black, to point out the underlying premise of
the majority holding. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting). "The Equal Protection Clause is no more appropriate a vehicle for the
'shock the conscience' test than is the Due Process Clause," id. at 394; and Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675-680 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting)
(criticism of "natural-law-due-process formula"). To its great credit, the Court
prevented the State of Texas from denying public schooling to the children of illegal
aliens under this natural law tradition. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982): "Even if the
State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their
children, legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children
does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice." Id. at 220. It is important
to note that even when refusing to apply the "shock-the-conscience" test, the Court
has never abandoned it. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1147 (1986) and
Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. (1947).
61. 329 U.S. 459, 473 (1947) (Burton, J., dissenting).
We do not question that on facts more egregious than those presented here
police deception might rise to a level of a due process violation.... We hold
only that, on these facts, the challenged conduct falls short of the kind of
misbehavior that so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a
federal intrusion into the criminal processes of the States.
Id.
62. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (after the defendant swallowed two
capsules containing morphine, the police directed a doctor to force an emetic solution
through a tube into the defendant's stomach. Resulting evidence was excluded.)
63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
64. Jaffa, supra note 2, at 403.
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the absence of both history and text condemning the practice
in the fifth amendment.65 The Justices simply could not stom-
ach the scandal of federal segregation any longer.6
I cannot believe that Professor Jaffa lacks sympathy for a
judge confronting a fundamental injustice. He does not con-
demn Griswold,67 and I doubt he would condemn Skinner.68
Furthermore, the refusal of the Justices to countenance
oppression is fully in keeping with the spirit of inherent rights
that Professor Jaffa celebrates and that the ninth amendment
embodies. Without any textual support at all, governments
have never possessed authority to segregate or otherwise to
oppress their citizens. Why then is Professor Jaffa so certain
that governments have been given authority to kill their pris-
oners through capital punishment? While I acknowledge that
opinions differ, it is clear to me that killing a citizen in a prison
cell is utterly inconsistent with the ends of free government.
And if, upon reflection and moral insight, a Justice is con-
vinced of this truth, the Justice has an obligation to act-even
if alone.
Of course, setting oneself up as spokesman for truth
against the judgment of the majority of one's fellows is no
small thing. But thinkers about the Constitution should not
overemphasize the danger. Certainly this context was not
unfamiliar to the Framers. They knew that majorities were
capable of despotism. I do not doubt, for example, that a large
majority would agree today to modest torture for certain mur-
derers, except that we are restrained by the eighth amend-
ment. If the eighth amendment were removed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist believes this protection would vanish.69 But this
65. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
66. Id. at 500: "In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states
from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the
same Constitution would impose a lesser duty in the Federal Government." Id.
67. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1968) (conviction for giving birth control
instruction to married couple reversed). Griswold is discussed by Professor Jaffa with
at least an air of sympathy in Jaffa, supra note 2, at 402-04 (appendix A).
68. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1982) (Equal Protection bars sterilization
for persons convicted two or more times of felonies involving moral turpitude).
Skinner is generally regarded as a substantive due process case disguised as equal
protection. See Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH.
L. REV. 981, 1019 (1979).
69. See Government by Cliche, supra note 22, at 390-92. This article contains Chief
Justice Rehnquist's ultimate anti-natural rights statement. If seventy percent of the
American people wish to remove the Bill of Rights from the Constitution, then
according to our theory of constitutionalism, this would not be "an illegal, an immoral,
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view was not the Framers' view. The Framers viewed majori-
ties, even massive majorities, as inherently limited in wielding
power.
Moreover, while the Justices may each act alone, the
Court acts corporately. It is never going to be easy to convince
five Justices, appointed through the political process, to con-
demn a generally accepted practice without the comfort of
strong textual support. If even without textual support, a
majority of the Court finds a practice repugnant to conscience,
we can have some confidence in their conclusions. They are
practicing the tradition of inherent rights that Professor Jaffa
supports. When a judicial majority does this, Professor Jaffa
should condemn them for being wrong, for being unpersuasive
in their reason, or for giving no reasons at all. There have
been occasions on which the Justices have been wrong, unper-
suasive, and willful. But one who believes what Professor
Jaffa believes should not condemn the Justices for standing
against injustice.
I agree with Professor Jaffa that liberals do not follow the
tradition of the Declaration of Independence. In the portions
of opinions by Justice Brennan quoted by Professor Jaffa, the
plea is made to a future consensus. That is, Justice Brennan
asserts that one day a majority will agree with him in con-
demning the death penalty. If this assertion were merely pre-
diction, we could say that truth is powerful and is eventually
irresistible. But Justice Brennan is justifying, not predicting.
He votes against the death penalty in part on the strength of a
future majority. Justice Brennan emerges in Professor Jaffa's
quotations as devoted to a sociological jurisprudence similar to
that of Chief Justice Rehnquist. Both Justices rely on notions
of majority consensus. Chief Justice Rehnquist relies on
today's majority; Justice Brennan relies on that of tomorrow.
Neither man relies on an enduring standard of right.
Professor Jaffa thus shows us an exhausted constitutional
tradition, not so much at the level of what judges still do, but
what legal thinkers teach about the possibility of a moral law.
This exhausted tradition is incapable of addressing the serious
issues of the rights of persons and of the nature of free govern-
ment for it lacks faith that people have such rights or that free
government is inherently superior to any other kind. On the
or an improper act." Chief Justice Rehnquist added, "[i]t might well be unwise ....
Yes, it might.
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conservative side, the tradition drifts toward utilitarian tinker-
ing,70 on the liberal side, toward alienated individualism. The
traditional mainline thinkers fail to ask of law any questions
larger than itself.
We are not destined, doomed I should say, to continue on
this course. Professor Jaffa has put us in touch in a vital way
with a tradition of law much healthier than the one we know
today. But Professor Jaffa is not content to let that tradition
speak to us. He is justly proud, but at the same time fearful,
because the Framers' power may be misread and misused.
From his perspective, Professor Jaffa's fear is well justi-
fied. Once we take the rights of persons seriously and the
strengthening of free government as law's obligation, we can-
not avoid asking about the rest of the rights of man: about eco-
nomic rights-to shelter, food, clothing, and education; about
social rights-to wear religious clothing and to love a person of
the same sex; and about corporate rights-to prevent the police
from lying to attorneys and to bar unconstitutional actions by
our government. The Supreme Court has spoken negatively
on all of these matters. In each case, Professor Jaffa seems
confident that we have been faithful to the Declaration of
Independence. I am certain we have not. But it is clear to
both of us that we must strive within our powers to be faithful.
For our legal tradition and those who participate in it are
judged by enduring standards of right and wrong.
70. There is nothing hateful about "utilitarian tinkering." If law and economics
can help to prevent accidents at lower cost, to better deter crime, or to recognize
inconsistencies between goals and means, why would anyone object? It is only the
imperial claim to embody all clear-thinking human understanding that makes law and
economics a proper object of scorn.
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